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Stanford J. Smith, Jr. and Jeff M. Pike* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
2019 provided no shortage of excitement, as there were more 
oil and gas opinions issued by the Kansas Supreme Court than in a 




*Stanford J. Smith, Jr. is a partner at Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & 
Bauer, LLP. Stan received his B.A. from the University of Kansas, and went on to 
complete his J.D. at the University of Kansas School of Law. He focuses his prac-
tice on energy & oil and gas law, civil & commercial litigation, and mediation. He 
is AV rated, a member of the Kansas Independent Oil and Gas Association, and a 
past president of the Kansas Bar Association Oil & Gas section. 
     Jeff M. Pike is an attorney at Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, 
LLP. Jeff graduated from Kansas State University and went on to complete his J.D. 
(cum laude) at the Washburn University School of Law. He focuses his practice on 
energy & oil and gas law and civil & commercial litigation. 
1. See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Oneok Field Servs. Co., 448 P.3d 383 (Kan. 
2019); Jason Oil Co. v. Littler, 446 P.3d 1058 (Kan. 2019); Oxy USA Inc. v. Red 
Wing Oil, L.L.C., 442 P.3d 504 (Kan. 2019). 
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are no major legislative developments to report for this year.  The first 
case decided whether the common-law rule against perpetuities should 
be applied to exceptions of defeasible term mineral interests.2  The 
second case is “yet another round in [a] high-dollar subsurface prize 
fight” about who has the right to gas that has escaped from an under-
ground natural gas storage facility.3  The third case analyzes whether 
the misappropriation of royalty payments gives rise to a claim of ad-
verse possession.4  Additionally, the Kansas Court of Appeals released 
an oil and gas opinion, which will be briefly discussed.5 
 
II.  JASON OIL CO. V. LITTLER 
 
In Jason Oil Co. v. Littler, the court had to determine whether 
an exception of a defeasible term mineral interest violates the com-
mon-law rule against perpetuities.6  Generally, an exception of a de-
feasible term mineral interest includes the grantor conveying the sur-
face estate to the grantee but reserving the mineral interest for a term 
of years “and so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced.”7  These 
types of exceptions create a springing executory future interest in the 
grantee.8  The springing executory interest could theoretically vest 
whenever, consequently, it violates the famous Rule Against Perpetu-
ities.9  Applying the Rule to this type of interest produces a counter-
 
2. Jason Oil Co., 446 P. 3d at 1059. 
3. N. Nat. Gas Co., 448 P.3d at 386. This series of litigation has spanned 
over a decade and involved multiple cases in various courts. See David E. Pierce, 
Kansas, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 81, 82–87 (Spring 2015). 
4. Oxy USA Inc., 442 P.3d at 508. 
5. Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, No. 120,121, 2019 WL 
3977825 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug 23, 2019). 
6. Jason Oil Co., 446 P.3d at 1059. 
7. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 49.13(f) 
(David A. Thomas, ed., 2003).  For example, the exception of the defeasible term 
mineral interest at issue in Jason Oil Co. read “EXCEPT AND SUBJECT TO: 
Grantor saves and excepts all oil, gas and other minerals in and under or that may 
be produced from said land for a period of 20 years or as long thereafter as oil 
and/or gas and/or other minerals may be produced therefrom and thereunder.”  Ja-
son Oil Co., 446 P.3d at 1060. 
8. David E. Pierce, Kansas – Oil & Gas, MIN. L. NEWSL. (Rocky Mountain 
Min. L. Found., Westminister, CO), Number 3, 2019, at 11. 
9. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 7, at § 49.13(f).  A different 
outcome would exist, however, if a grant of a defeasible term mineral interest was 
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intuitive result, as the grantor would then own the mineral interest out-
right.10 
The first step for the court was to classify exactly what type of 
future interest was at issue in the case.11  A handful of other states have 
looked at this issue, and the court noted some of these jurisdictions 
have twisted common-law property rules and classifications to avoid 
applying the Rule to these exceptions. 12  Instead of doing this, the 
court decided to call a spade a spade and recognized the future interest 
at issue in the case is a springing executory interest.13  Thus, the next 
question for the court was whether it wanted to carve out a narrow 
exception to the common-law rule against perpetuities for exceptions 
of defeasible term mineral interests.14  If not, the Rule would invali-
date the future interest.15 
To determine if it should carve out a narrow exception to the 
common-law Rule, the court focused on the public policy behind the 
Rule.16  The court articulated that in Kansas, the clear policy behind 
the Rule is ensuring the alienability of property and next examined 
whether applying the Rule to reservations of defeasible term mineral 
interests would promote the alienability of property.17  The court held 
that defeasible term mineral interests actually promote the alienability 
of property, not hinder it.18  This is because applying the Rule in this 
instance would keep the surface and mineral estates split, which would 
increase the difficulty for a potential buyer who wants to buy the entire 
property.19  The potential buyer would be able to not only negotiate 
with the surface estate owner, but they would also have to locate and 
negotiate with every heir who had received a portion of the mineral 
 
involved instead of an exception.  Id.  In this situation, the grantor would maintain 
a possibility of reverter which is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.  Id. 
10. Pierce, supra note 8, at 11. 
11. Jason Oil Co., 446 P.3d at 1063. 
12. Id. at 1064–65.  The court also mentions that this same analysis would 
be employed for the reservation of a defeasible term mineral interest in addition to 
an exception.  Id. at 1065. 
13. Id. at 1065. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1065–66. 
17. Id. at 1066–67; Pierce, supra note 8, at 11. 
18. Jason Oil Co., 446 P.3d at 1066–67.   
19. Id. 
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estate, even where there was no longer production of oil and gas on 
the property.20 
The court also relied on the reasoning of the Williams & Myers 
treatise, quoting: 
 
[D]efeasible term interests serve a useful social pur-
pose, whether reserved or granted. The term interest, as 
compared with a perpetual interest, tends to remove ti-
tle complications when the land is no longer productive 
of oil or gas. This simplification of title promotes al-
ienability of land, which is one purpose served by the 
Rule against Perpetuities. We believe, therefore, that 
the courts should simply exempt interests following 
granted or reserved defeasible term interests from the 
Rule, on the straightforward basis that they serve social 
and commercial convenience and do not offend the pol-
icy of the Rule Against Perpetuities.21 
 
The court ultimately held exceptions of defeasible term mineral inter-
ests are “ingrained in the oil and gas industry” and furthers the Rule’s 
purpose as opposed to inhibiting it.22  Thus, the court decided not to 
apply the Rule in this situation because “[a]pplying the Rule here 
would be counterproductive to the purpose behind the Rule and create 
chaos.”23 
This case has the potential to impact areas of law beyond oil 
and gas.24  As Professor David E. Pierce notes, “litigants should be 
able to use the court’s analysis to avoid the Rule in other oil and gas 
and non-oil and gas contexts.”25  Thus, it remains to be seen just how 
far Kansas courts are willing to temper the once-rigid Rule. 
 




21. Id. at 1067 (citing 2 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 335 
(2018)). 
22. Id. at 1068. 
23. Id. 
24. Pierce, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
25. Id. 
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Those familiar with Kansas oil and gas law have most likely 
heard of the Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK underground stor-
age litigation, which has already lasted over a decade.26  2019 provided 
yet another chapter in this long-lasting saga.27  A full recap of this 
series of cases could last pages, so this Survey will attempt to remain 
focused on the takeaways from the most recent case.28 
In this case, the precise issue was whether a public utility re-
ceiving a certificate from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
or the Kansas Corporation Commission impairs the right of operators 
in a reservoir to produce non-native natural gas injected by the public 
utility into an underground storage field.29  To answer this question, 
the court had to walk through the history of Kansas underground nat-
ural gas storage law.30  The court first revisited its holding in Anderson 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,31 which was when non-native gas is injected 
into a common pool by an entity that is not a public utility, the gas is 
subject to the rule of capture.32  Thus, other operators in the pool can 
produce non-native gas without legal consequences.33 
Whereas Anderson didn’t involve a public utility, Union Gas 
System, Inc. v. Carnahan did.34  The court in Union Gas had to deter-
mine who has ownership of migratory non-native gas injected into an 
underground storage facility by a public utility both before and after 
the public utility receives a certificate of authority for that area.35  The 
court held that the migrated non-native gas that was produced before 
the public utility received certification for underground storage was 
subject to the Anderson rule.36  Consequently, operators were able to 
 
26. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Oneok Field Servs. Co., 448 P.3d 383, 386 (Kan. 
2019). 
27. Id. 
28. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 82–87 for a more robust discussion of the 
cases involved in this litigation. 
29. N. Nat. Gas. Co., 448 P.3d at 385–87. 
30. See id. at 388. 
31. Id. at 389. See Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 
1985).  
32. N. Nat. Gas Co., 448 P.3d at 391. 
33. Id. 
34. Union Gas Sys., Inc. v. Carnahan, 774 P.2d 962, 964 (Kan. 1989). 
35. N. Nat. Gas Co., 448 P.3d at 391–92. 
36. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 774 P.2d at 967. 
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produce this gas and sell it legally until the public utility got a certifi-
cate of authority to store gas in the area.37 
The Union Gas court reached a different result, however, for 
the migrated gas after the public utility received a certificate of author-
ity to condemn the property for storage of natural gas.38  The court 
held once a certificate of authority to condemn more of the reservoir 
is issued, the migrated gas is no longer subject to the rule of capture 
inside the certificated area.39  Thus, title to the migrated non-native 
gas taken from the storage field’s certificated boundaries remains in 
the public utility as long as it is identifiable.40 
The Northern Natural Gas Co. court recognized that due to the 
similarities between its case and Union Gas, if Union Gas is still good 
law, it controls the outcome.41  The court outlined three potential ar-
guments for why Union Gas may no longer be good law which were: 
(1) it was superseded by K.S.A.55-1210; (2) it was overruled by 
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Martin, Pringle;42 and (3) it results in an 
unconstitutional taking of property.43  The court, however, dismissed 
all three of these arguments and held Union Gas is still good law in 
this particular circumstance.44 
In 1993, K.S.A. 55-1210 was passed as a result of the under-
ground gas storage battles being waged in Kansas.45  The section of 
the statute relevant to this case reads: 
 
With regard to natural gas that has migrated to adjoin-
ing property or to a stratum, or portion thereof, which 
has not been condemned as allowed by law or other-
wise purchased: The injector, such injector’s heirs, suc-
cessors and assigns shall not lose title to or possession 
of such gas if such injector, such injector’s heirs, 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 968. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
           41. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Oneok Field Servs. Co., 448 P.3d 383, 394 (Kan. 
2019) 
           42. See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, LLP, 
217 P.3d 966 (Kan. 2009).. 
           43. N. Nat. Gas Co., 448 P.3d at 395. 
           44. Id. 
           45. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 83. 
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successors or assigns can prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that such gas was originally injected into 
the underground storage.46 
 
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co. (ONEOK 
I), the court held the statute did not completely preempt the field, 
meaning prior case law in the area is still good law in situations the 
statute does not directly address.47  Relying on this, the court in the 
current case held that Union Gas is still good law in circumstances 
K.S.A. 55-1210 does not specifically address.48  Such situations in-
clude, “how the common-law rule of capture operates during the time 
between certificate issuance and storage rights acquisition,”  which 
was what was at issue in this case.49 
The next argument for Union Gas no longer being good law is that it 
was overruled by Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Martin, Pringle.50  This 
argument is based on language from Martin, Pringle, which stated 
landowners adjoining natural gas storage areas can continue to capture 
non-native gas that has migrated onto their property until the public 
utility “obtained a certificate to expand its storage area onto their land 
and paid them for that privilege through a condemnation action.”51  
This standard created an extra requirement for Union Gas in that the 
public utility has to pay landowners for the right to store the gas be-
neath their property before the rule of capture is turned off.52 The court 
here disposed of the extra requirement by saying it was just dicta, as 
the court in Martin, Pringle neither explicitly stated it was overruling 
Union Gas or gave any analysis of why it added the extra require-
ment.53  Thus, Union Gas remains good law.54 
 
           46. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1210(c)(1) (2005). 
           47. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Oneok Field Servs. Co. (ONEOK I), 296 P.3d 1106, 
1125 (Kan. 2013). 
          48. N. Nat. Gas Co., 448 P.3d at 395. 
          49. Id. at 396. 
          50. Id. 
          51. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Martin, Pringle, Wallace, & Bauer, L.L.P, 217 P.3d 
966, 976.  Essentially, this standard would allow gas to be taken from the certifi-
cated area until actual condemnation occurs.  N. Nat. Gas Co., 448 P.3d at 396. 
          52. Id. 
          53. Id. at 396-97. 
          54. Id. at 397. 
  
226 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
Finally, the court shut down the argument that Union Gas con-
stitutes an unconstitutional taking of property.55  In short, the court 
articulated the rule of capture only gives an operator the right to pro-
duce gas, and it does not give the operator the right to the gas itself.56  
Therefore, no taking occurs when operators are no longer able to cap-
ture gas in a certificated area.57 
All in all, the court held that Union Gas is still good law in 
certain contexts and its holding controlled in this case.58  To reiterate, 
Union Gas established others cannot capture an injector’s migrated 
gas “after a natural gas public utility obtains certificated authority to 
use a storage area and its gas within that area is identifiable”59 
 
IV. OXY USA INC. V. RED WING OIL, LLC 
 
Oxy USA Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC involved the question of 
whether the improper receipt of royalties can give rise to a claim for 
adverse possession.60  The facts in Oxy revolve around the reservation 
of a defeasible term mineral interest which expired in 1972.61  From 
1972 to 2009, royalties were paid to the wrong group of owners.62  The 
operator continued to pay royalties to those who obtained the grantor’s 
interest, even though it was extinguished in 1972 when the surface and 
mineral estates were reunited.63  Thus, the question in the case was do 
these years of improper royalties prevent the owner of the grantee’s 
interest from enforcing her rights now due to adverse possession?64  
The Kansas Supreme Court said no.65 
 
           55. Id. at 398–99. 
           56. Id. at 399.  
           57. Id. 
           58. Id. at 400. 
           59. Id. 
           60. Oxy USA Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC, 442 P.3d 504, 505 (Kan. 2019). 
           61. Id. at 506. 
           62. Id.  The reason royalties were still being paid after the defeasible term 
mineral interest ended in 1972 is because the oil and gas lease on the property was 
unitized with leases on surrounding property, however, a well was not actually 
drilled on the quarter section of at land at issue in this case until 2009.  Oxy USA, 
Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC, 360 P.3d 457, 459–60 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015). 
           63. Oxy USA Inc., 442 P.3d at 506. 
           64. Id. 
           65. Id. at 505. 
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While the court started by recognizing it is possible to ad-
versely possess minerals, it quickly disposed of the argument that was 
what happened here.66  The court stated “[a] royalty represents a por-
tion of the value of minerals after production.”67  “Thus, being in open, 
exclusive, and continuous possession of a royalty can never suffice to 
establish an adverse claim over minerals in place.”68  The court called 
the misappropriation of royalties a conversion “akin to tapping a pipe-
line and diverting its flow.”69  In order to actually adversely possess 
the minerals, the attempted adverse possessor would have had to do 
something to work the mineral estate.70  Thus, the mineral estate was 
quieted in favor of the fee owner who had inherited the original 
grantee’s interest.71 
 
V.  LARIO OIL & GAS CO. V. KANSAS CORPORATION COMM’N 
 
Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corporation Comm’n is a Kan-
sas Court of Appeals case that centers around a large fight to unitize a 
geological formation.  However, it will only be discussed very briefly 
because it adds very little new to Kansas law.72 
In short terms, unitization is the combining of oil and gas 
leases in a pool to operate them as a single unit.73  In order for a reser-
voir to qualify as a pool under the Kansas unitization statutes, the res-
ervoir must be a single pressure system.74  In Lario, the party in favor 
of unitization argued that pools near the end of their economic life and 
pools not near the end of their economic life should have a “different 
standard for pressure communication.”75  The court shut this argument 
down, however, stating “[a]ll units, regardless of their economic 
 
           66. Id. at 508. 
           67. Id. 
           68. Id. 
           69. Id. 
           70. Id. (citing 1 KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 10.5 (1987)). 
           71. Id. 
           72. Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, No. 120,121, 2019 WL 
3977825, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug 23, 2019). 
           73. Id. at *2. 
           74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1302(b) (2018). 
           75. Lario Oil & Gas Co., 2019 WL 3977825, at *9. 
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conditions, must be single-pressure systems according to K.S.A. 55-
1302(b).”76 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This reporting period provided plenty of excitement for those 
interested in Kansas oil and gas law.  Once again, a few of the main 
takeaways are: (1) the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities does 
not apply to exceptions of defeasible term mineral interests; (2) Union 
Gas is still good law in certain contexts, and the rule of capture “does 
not apply after a natural gas public utility obtains certificated authority 
to use a storage area and its gas within that area is identifiable;”77 and 




           76. Id. 
           77. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Oneok Field Servs. Co., 448 P.3d 383, 406 (Kan. 
2019). 
